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Hegel, Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage
Philip J. Kain
Santa Clara University

Abstract
To understand Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) and the role that love
and marriage play in it, we must understand his concept of recognition. It is a
mistake, however, to think as some do that mutual recognition between equals
is sufficient for Sittlichkeit. Rather, for Hegel, the more significant and powerful
the recognizer, the more real the recognized. Ultimately recognition must come
from spirit (Geist). Understanding this will allow us to see, despite Hegel, that
he can capture, better than other theorists, many of the central concerns of
contemporary same-sex marriage proponents and help provide them a
philosophical underpinning.

I.
Hegel distinguishes between Moralität and Sittlichkeit.1 Moralität, in Hegel’s
view, begins with Socrates and reaches its high point in Kant. Moralität is rational

and reflective morality. Individuals must themselves rationally decide what is
moral and act because reason tells them it is the right thing to do. This reflective
component is relatively absent in traditional Sittlichkeit, which is best represented
in the Greek polis before the rise of Socratic Moralität. Sittlichkeit is ethical behavior
grounded in custom and tradition and developed through habit and imitation in
accordance with the laws and practices of the community. Sittlichkeit is ethical life
built into one’s character, disposition, and inclinations. Hegel thinks ancient
Sittlichkeit was destroyed by the rise of individuality and became inadequate to the
modern world. What is needed, then, is a higher Sittlichkeit that can combine the
undeveloped Sittlichkeit of the ancient world with the rational reflection and
individuality of modern Moralität.2 In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel tries to work
out this higher Sittlichkeit.
In that text, in order to move us beyond Kantian Moralität and on to the first and
simplest level of Sittlichkeit, Hegel takes up the family. He writes:

The family, as the immediate substantiality of spirit, has as its determination the
spirit’s feeling … of its own unity, which is love…. Love means in general the
consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not isolated on my own …,
but gain my self-consciousness only through the renunciation of my independent
existence … and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and
of the other with me. But love is a feeling …, that is, ethical life [Sittlichkeit] in its
natural form.… The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an
independent person in my own right … and that, if I were, I would feel deficient
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and incomplete. The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that
I gain recognition in this person …, who in turn gains recognition in me.3

To understand Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit and the role that love plays in it, we
must understand his concept of recognition. The fullest and best treatment of these
matters is to be found in the work of Robert R. Williams. He argues that for Hegel
reciprocal recognition is not only constitutive of love and the family but of the state
as an ethical community.4 Indeed, it is constitutive not only of Sittlichkeit but of all
right,5

Simply stated, right is the relation of persons to each other, as they recognize (or
fail to recognize) each other. The genesis of right therefore coincides with the
recognition of the other as other. Right is present whenever the other is
recognized as counting, as carrying weight against one’s freedom, and vice
versa.6

It is Williams’ view that in the master-slave dialectic of the Phenomenology of
Spirit, Hegel developed his concept of recognition in the shape of inequality and
domination. Hegel’s treatment of the family is of special interest because here he
develops his concept of recognition in the shape of love—and for Williams love
excludes domination and inequality. But then Williams finds it disappointing that
Hegel presents a traditional view of gender roles that are anything but equal.7 The
point would seem to be that Hegel holds, correctly in Williams’ view, that love
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implies reciprocal recognition between equals,8 but that Hegel does not think men
and women are equal. Thus, for Williams, there is a tension in Hegel’s thought.
While I agree that mutual recognition plays a fundamental and central role in
Hegel’s concept of the family, the state, and of Sittlichkeit in general, nevertheless I
do not think we have a tension in Hegel’s thought here. I do not think so because I
think it is a mistake to hold that love requires equality and that for Hegel the form of
recognition most important for Sittlichkeit can simply be between equals. This must
be explained.
There are places where Hegel does in fact claim that love is between equals.9
And he sticks to this in the Philosophy of Right in that he rejects the sort of severe
inequality implied in marriages arranged arbitrarily by parents who do not consult
the marriage partners. He thinks these occur among “peoples who hold the female
sex in little respect … ”10 Hegel also rejects polygamy, in which he thinks wives do
not attain to their rights.11 While rejecting such forms of inequality, it is clear in the
Philosophy of Right that Hegel does not consider men and women to be equal in any
deeper sense. For Hegel, one sex is powerful and active, the other passive and
subjective. He says,

Man therefore has his actual substantial life in the state, in learning …, etc., and
otherwise in work and struggle with the external world and with himself.…
Woman, however, has her substantial vocation … in the family, and her ethical
disposition consists in this … piety.… Women may well be educated, but they are
not made for the higher sciences, for philosophy and certain artistic productions
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which require a universal element. Women may have insights …, taste, and
delicacy, but they do not possess the ideal. The difference between man and
woman is the difference between animal and plant; the animal is closer in
character to man, the plant to women, the latter is a more peaceful [process of]
unfolding whose principle is the more indeterminate unity of feeling…. When
women are in charge of government, the state is in danger, for their actions are
based not on the demands of universality but on contingent inclination and
opinion. The education of women takes place imperceptibly, as if through the
atmosphere of representational thought, more through living than through the
acquisition of knowledge …, whereas man attains his position only through the
attainment of thought and numerous technical exertions.12

In nature, accidents can occur, there can be divergences from the essential
determination. There have been women who devoted themselves to science, but
they do not pursue it deeply, and they make no discoveries. In art they can
produce things that are pleasant, but the ideal … is beyond them.13

Clearly, then, Hegel does not take men and women to be equal. And his
occasional claims that love requires equality, I suggest, should be understood as
limited to ruling out severe inequality of the sort implied by arbitrarily arranged
marriages and polygamy. At the same time, as I have argued elsewhere, it is a
misunderstanding to think that love somehow requires, necessitates, or is
impossible without, equality.14
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Love can be accompanied by equality, as Hegel thinks is the case between
brother and sister.15 But love does not require equality. I certainly agree that it is
desirable that a loving relationship between husband and wife also be a relationship
of equality. But just as a relationship of equality need not involve love, so we can
have love without having equality. To think that love and equality necessarily go
together is to romanticize love—to expect something of it that it is not. It is quite
normal for people to love someone they consider their inferior or their superior—
God, the King, the Queen, our children, our parents. For centuries, men have loved
their wives while thinking them their inferiors. And there is no good reason to think
that many of these men did not really love their wives—certainly not because love
and inequality are in some way incompatible. Those relationships, I certainly agree,
would have been improved by equality, but there is nothing about loving someone
that one considers an inferior that necessarily distorts the love. Love and equality
are just different things. Love can be perfectly real love when it is love of an equal, a
superior, or an inferior.
Furthermore, while it is quite possible to love someone who is your inferior, this
is not at all incompatible with taking that person, in another sense, to be your
superior. In love, I find myself in the person I love, and I am recognized by that
person.16 That the most wonderful and important person in the world loves me,
makes me feel that I am worth such love. It reinforces and confirms me. What is it
that makes that person the most wonderful and important person in the world?
While the lover may not want to hear this, it is the fact that the lover takes the loved
one to be such—that the lover recognizes the loved one to be the most wonderful
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and important person in the world, the person from whom the lover desires
recognition.
At any rate, it is clear that nobody wants recognition from a nobody and that
such recognition is not worth anything. That was the problem in the master-slave
dialectic. The master depended for recognition on the slave. The only thing that
made the master a master, the only source of recognition for the master, the only
thing that could constitute his reality as a master, was the recognition that the
master in battle coerced out of the slave.17 What could such recognition be worth?
Moreover, it was the master himself who made the slave a nobody. What kind of
reality can be constituted for the master by recognition forced from a nobody?
It is clear that adequate recognition can neither be gotten from a radical inferior
nor gotten through coercion. Such recognition cannot establish my reality. Thus the
recognition that one hopes for in a loving relationship like marriage cannot be
coerced and it must rule out the sort of serious inequality found in arbitrarily
arranged marriages, in polygamy, and, now we can add, in slavery. But, for Hegel, no
greater equality is to be expected. Furthermore, it is not required.
It is not required because the recognition that takes place between the loving
couple, even if they were to be perfectly equal, is not enough to constitute a marriage
in the first place. For Hegel,

the solemn declaration of consent to the ethical bond of marriage and its
recognition and confirmation by the family and community constitute the formal
conclusion and actuality of marriage.… It is accordingly only after this ceremony
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has first taken place … that this bond has been ethically constituted.… Friedrich
von Schlegel in his Lucinde and a follower of his … have argued that the marriage
ceremony is superfluous and a formality which could be dispensed with, on the
grounds that love is the substantial element and that its value may even be
diminished by this celebration. These writers represent the physical surrender
as necessary in order to prove the freedom and intensity of love—an argument
with which seducers are not unfamiliar.18

The recognition involved in reciprocal love is not adequate to constitute a
marriage. Recognition by family and community is required besides. Thus even
here at this first level of Sittlichkeit, where we have a simple model of mutual
recognition between equals (even if they are not perfectly equal), we see that
recognition between such equals, while necessary, and while very important at a
personal level, is nevertheless not sufficient to constitute even the relationship of
marriage. Relying on recognition from an inferior, we have seen in “Lordship and
Bondage,” is inadequate, but so is recognition between equals or near equals. If
reciprocal recognition between equals were adequate, we could, with Schlegel,
dispense with the marriage ceremony as superfluous. Even here at the level of love
and marriage, I suggest, we can recognize Hegel’s general commitment to the notion
that the more significant the recognizer, the more real the recognized. Moreover, if
we look closely, we can find this notion in other places where Hegel discusses
reciprocal recognition between equals,
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In an ethical totality such as a family or a state, all are recognized. Thus the
struggle for recognition has disappeared.… In society all citizens are recognized
and count as free. The freedom of every individual exists only insofar as he is
recognized as free by the others, and the others have in him the consciousness of
their own legitimacy, [that they count for him]. In a rightful situation, every
person counts, because he allows everyone else to count as free. I am free
insofar as the others are free, and I let them count as free just as they let me
count as free. In love and friendship this [counting] is more at the emotional
level, but in civil society I count as an abstract person without regard to my
subjective peculiarities.19

It is clear here that the freedom of any individual, as well as right in general,
requires recognition by other individuals, and at the same time it is quite clear that
this means recognition by others in the plural—recognition by civil society or the
state.
Hegel’s view can be summed up, I think, by saying that the more important the
recognizer, the more valuable the recognition and the more real the recognized. The
recognition gained in love is valuable and important. By itself, however, it does not
even make me a husband. It certainly does not make me a citizen. It is not clear that
it even makes me a person, if a person is that to which civil law applies and which it
recognizes and protects. Besides, love can fade and end in separation or divorce. As
valuable as the recognition of another person is, I need a recognizer that is more
stable, lasting, important, and powerful than another person.
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Moreover, Hegel thinks that individuals historically have known quite well that
recognition by an equal is not sufficient. In the section of the Phenomenology
entitled “Culture and its Realm of Actuality,” where Hegel describes the rise of
absolute monarchy in France, we see that individuals realize that the more
important and powerful the recognizer, the more real and significant the
recognized. Consequently they set about constructing powerful institutions that
they can collectively serve, so as to create a reality important enough that the
recognition they can get back from it will make them significant.20 We might ask
ourselves whether Noble Consciousness would rather serve the greatest and most
powerful monarch of all time or some petty regent ruling a peripheral backwater?
Those who construct and serve the most powerful of monarchs become more real
and important by doing so. Institutions from which we are to gain recognition,
Hegel thinks, must be raised above ourselves. What we need, he thinks, is the
highest and most significant recognition, recognition we cannot get even from an
absolute monarch, which after all is soon to be overthrown in the French
Revolution. What we need, Hegel will argue in later parts of the Philosophy of Right,
is recognition from a modern rational state, and, as we will see shortly, ultimately
from spirit (Geist).
And so, in the Philosophy of Right, as we begin to examine Sittlichkeit and the
recognition involved in it, as we start with the simplest sort of ethical relation, a
loving relationship between two individuals, we begin to see even in this
relationship, if we examine it carefully, that it involves much more than a relation
between two individuals. It requires recognition from family and community. Thus
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even this simple relationship will force us to move on and take up more complex
forms of recognition, not just to understand Sittlichkeit, but even to understand this
simple relationship of love and marriage itself.

II.
Hegel rejects the notion that marriage is to be understood merely as a natural,
physical, sexual relationship, as he thinks it was for the natural law tradition. So
also, he finds it equally objectionable to reduce marriage, as does Kant, merely to a
civil contract entitling the parties to the sexual use of each other.21 Furthermore, he
thinks such marriages should not be arbitrarily arranged by parents. At the other
end of the spectrum, however, marriage should not simply be equated with love, a
feeling open to contingency, transience, and capriciousness.22
All of these conceptions of marriage fall below the ethical, and marriage, for
Hegel, is an ethical relationship. Marriage should subordinate the natural drive and
the contingency and transience of the passions to the spiritual bond that must assert
itself as the substantial factor. This substantial bond constitutes the two individuals
as a single person between whom a contract would be out of place.23 The
substantial ethical bond of marriage originates not in an arbitrary arrangement by
parents but in the free consent of the individuals. This substantial ethical bond,
however, is concluded and actualized only through recognition by the family and the
community. “Marriage is the formal union of two person of differing sex, brought to
public recognition and so acquiring the status of a legal relationship … ”24 Schlegel’s
view that such a ceremony is superfluous because love is all that matters is a view
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that Hegel rejects. Such a relationship would lack adequate recognition and thus
ethical substantiality.25
For Hegel, the producing of children is not the sole or essential goal of
marriage.26 It is possible to marry even if it is not possible to have children.
Marriage “unites the different aspects of a particular determinate existence, and no
single aspect is an absolute end on its own account.”27 It is also the case, for Hegel,
that marriage should not be concluded within the natural circle of people familiar to
each other, certainly not by blood relatives. It should take place between people
from different families and who are different in origin. The power of spirit
“increases with the magnitude of oppositions out of which it reconstitutes itself.”28
In his discussion of marriage, we begin to understand in greater depth Hegel’s
concept of recognition, as well as its importance and significance. Recognition
makes things real. Just as property is only property because it is formally
recognized by a proper authority, just as a state is legitimate, that is, a real state,
only if it is recognized by its citizens and by other states, just as citizens are only
really citizens if they are recognized by other citizens and by a legitimate state, so a
couple is only really married if their union is recognized by their family and their
community, that is, only if it is brought to public recognition and so acquires the
status of a legal relationship.29
To illuminate this further, I want to compare Hegel’s traditional conception of
marriage to contemporary arguments concerning same-sex marriage. This might
strike the reader as bizarre. Hegel would not have believed in same-sex marriage—
he thinks marriage must be between “persons of differing sex.”30 In fact, I cannot

12

imagine that Hegel would be anything but opposed to same-sex marriage.31
Likewise, no contemporary proponent of same-sex marriage that I know of makes
use of Hegel’s thought. The disregard, then, is mutual.
Nevertheless, I think contemporary arguments in favor of same-sex marriage
can illuminate especially well Hegel’s views on marriage and recognition, and I think
Hegel can capture, better than other theorists, more of the central issues that
concern proponents of same-sex marriage, and can help provide them a
philosophical underpinning.
Some gays and lesbians, of course, are not proponents of same-sex marriage, and
some of them even object to marriage as state regulation of personal relationships.32
In this they resemble Schlegel, who thought the value of a loving relationship might
even be diminished by marriage.33 Those who are proponents of same-sex marriage
often confront a similar sort of objection: Why is marriage necessary? Why not just
a loving relationship? Perhaps we could even allow legally recognized domestic
partnerships or civil unions? Why isn’t that enough? Even liberals who believe in
gay rights, at least some of them, find it difficult to go as far as accepting actual
marriage for same-sex couples and wonder why it is necessary. The answer is
perfectly clear to anyone who understands Hegel.34
Hegel rejects arbitrarily arranged marriages at one end of the spectrum and
mere love without marriage a la Schlegel at the other end of the spectrum. Hegel
wants a substantial ethical relationship between marriage partners made real by
recognition, not merely reciprocal recognition between the partners, not merely
recognition by family and friends, but recognition by the community, such that the
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relationship is brought to public recognition and acquires the status of a legal
relationship.35 Though no contemporary proponents of same-sex marriage that I
know of employ Hegel’s concept of recognition, nevertheless, this concept, it seems
to me, captures especially well what they are after. As one author puts it, same-sex
couples want the existing institution of marriage, “not some back-of-the-bus version
called ‘domestic partnership … ’”36 In other words, gays and lesbians want their
relationships to be just as real as relationships are between heterosexuals. They
want their marriage to be real for-themselves, for their spouses, for their families
and friends, for the state—in short, they want it to be real in-itself. They see, just as
Hegel does, that a loving relationship between two people, while highly valuable, is
not enough.
To the question, why not just get all the rights and benefits of marriage without
the name, the answer is that this means without the reality. It means that the
relationship between the same-sex couple is not as real as the relationship between
different-sex couples. It is not as significant. It is not worth as much. This demeans
and devalues the same-sex relationship—and it does so ontologically.
One should not have to think that one’s relationship is less than real—that one’s
marriage is not a real marriage. Marriages between two people are at the center of
their lives and identities. These identities need to be recognized as real, important,
and valuable. They should not be relegated to second-class status. Those involved
in them should not be seen as people who have devoted their lives to something
strange, quirky, or queer—something that does not have ontological significance.
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That demeans them. Their marriage, like any marriage, should be an ethicalspiritual bond actualized and made real by recognition.
We must also notice that for Hegel marriage is a spiritual union,37 that the
recognition involved is not just reciprocal recognition between two individuals, and
not even just recognition by family and community that has acquired a legal status;
it is recognition by spirit. To get a feel for what Hegel means by spirit (Geist), we
should think of things like the ‘spirit of an age,’ or the ‘spirit of capitalism,’ or the
‘American spirit.’ That is, spirit implies a worldview in which a people expresses its
aims, aspirations, values, role, significance, meaning, and goals to itself. This people,
then, through its activity in the world will embody this spirit in its laws, practices,
customs, social and political institutions, ethical life, art, culture, philosophy,
religion, and so forth. In this way spirit gets objectified, concretized,
institutionalized. And, as this concretized spirit is recognized by its people, it will
animate their will, passion, activity, and drive.38 A people constructs its spirit. They
set its aims, build its institutions, establish its laws. Spirit is not heteronomous. It is
their own. At the same time, spirit also constructs this people. It forms their
practices, inspires their work, molds their values, gives them meaning, and shapes
their culture. It produces character and disposition. In Hegel’s view it is stamped on
every aspect of their life. One spirit permeates everything in an age.39
Spirit gives us the ethical—it gives us Sittlichkeit.40 It tells us what is right. We
do not derive the right merely from our own personal rational analysis. Nor do we
derive it merely from the customs and traditions of our group. It is given by spirit.
Spirit is the historical outcome of reason embedded in our laws, institutions, and
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practices. It is given to us, objectively and concretely. Moreover, the universal will
have played a central role in the development of this given. Any principles or
practices that are less than universalizable will sooner or later come into conflict
with other principles or practices and drive us toward something more
universalizable. Anything short of the universal, anything that does not apply
equally to all, will sooner or later produce conflict and will sooner or later drive us
to extend the law—universalize it—to avoid the conflict. We will be driven on
toward the universal, the rational, the right—toward what the categorical
imperative would demand.41 Thus, what spirit gives us as right will be
universalizable. If not, it will sooner or later be destroyed and be moved toward the
universalizable.
Lacking recognition by spirit, same-sex marriages would not be real. The couple
may recognize their marriage as real, their family and friends may, their community
(if they live in the right community) may, the state of Massachusetts may, but if most
other states and the people that live there do not, the reality of this marriage will not
be fully actualized. At a certain point in the history of spirit’s development (and it
certainly seems that in Europe and the United States we are close to that point, if not
already there), spirit may recognize same-sex marriage. At that point, it will not
matter what Catholic Bishops, right-wing Fundamentalists, or even neighboring
states say. The couple will be married. Their marriage will be as real as any
marriage. This does not mean that same-sex marriage will be accepted as real by all
people, any more than that all people accepted the emancipation of slaves at first. It
will mean, however, that such people are now put in the position of failing to
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recognize a human right. Despite such people, slaves are free and same-sex couples
are married. And, at a certain point, such people no longer matter. They are swept
aside by spirit. Prejudice against Irish-Americans and Italian-Americans in the
United States has diminished to the point where if one encounters people who
express such prejudice they are just taken to be fools. The point is that spirit can
move beyond you and make your views wrong. No matter how deeply and sincerely
you believe that slavery is right or same-sex marriage wrong, you are swept aside
and begin to look like a fool.
However, Hegel has said that the power of spirit “increases with the magnitude
of oppositions out of which it reconstitutes itself.”42 Hegel does not think that
people who are close to each other in origin should marry.43 One might think this
same principle should be extended, and that only individuals of different sex, not the
same-sex, should marry. And Hegel might well agree with such an extension. He
certainly believes that only differing sexes should marry.44 Nevertheless, while it is
true that same-sex marriages are between individuals who are close to each other in
the sense that they are of the same sex, they are not at all close to each other in
another very important sense. Certainly in the past, same-sex marriage has
appeared to many as a joining of what is utterly alien, a joining of what cannot or
should not be joined. For spirit, then, to succeed in joining what cannot be joined
would be a triumph of spirit: a bringing together in the most intimate type of unity
of what previously seemed utterly alien.
One very standard argument against same-sex marriage is the slippery slope
argument: if you allow gays to marry, you start down a slippery slope toward
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polygamy, bestiality, incest, whatever. Hegel’s concept of spirit can provide an
effective counter here. For example, in many places in the world, polygamy is legal
and accepted. But I can detect no hint that in the spirit of the United States or
Europe there is any movement toward recognition of polygamy. Indeed, I suspect
that in polygamous countries there is possibly a slight movement away from
polygamy. At any rate, if the actual existence of polygamy in the world is not
pushing us down a slippery slope toward the recognition of polygamy, how could
same-sex marriage push us toward it?
As for bestiality, I see nothing to suggest the possibility of its recognition as a
legitimate form of marriage within our spirit, and the suggestion that same-sex
marriage would lead to bestiality, it seems to me, is an attempt to denigrate
homosexual acts by likening them to bestiality. On the other hand, if I may be
excused a science fiction moment: if an intelligent alien species were to be
discovered that looked, say, like cats,45 and it was a species that could chose to
marry, then to object to marriage between members of our species and this new
species would be more like objecting to mixed race marriages, and thus like racism,
than like objecting to bestiality. Our spirit has gotten beyond objections to mixed
race marriages and, I suspect, would be able to get beyond objections to inter
species marriages. Bestiality cannot amount to marriage if one party is forced, or
does not choose, or is not able to choose to enter into a relationship of reciprocal
recognition. If the two parties are fully able to choose to enter into a relationship of
reciprocal recognition, then their species, like their race, should not matter. And I
suspect that our spirit would eventually recognize this.
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Again, I see no tendency in our spirit toward the recognition of incestuous
marriages and I do not see how the recognition of same-sex marriages could lead in
that direction. Basically, Hegel’s concept of spirit forestalls the slippery slope
argument. The slippery slope argument operates at the level of sheer abstraction. It
proceeds by arguing that if we allow one new thing that is strange, different, or
bizarre, then why not all other strange, different, and bizarre possibilities? Hegel is
always opposed to such abstraction and his concept of spirit gives us a concreteness
that allows us to meaningfully explore whether one change in spirit might
concretely lead to another, rather than assuming it could simply because both are
new, strange, or bizarre. We can tell concretely whether our spirit is likely to
recognize polygamy, bestiality, or incest.
Furthermore, Hegel’s concept of spirit should make it easier for us to see what
some proponents of same-sex marriage argue would be the result of legalizing it,
namely, that marriage in general would be strengthened and reinforced. Marriage
would be made even broader in scope—more universal.46
Opponents, on the other hand, often argue that same-sex marriage would be a
threat to marriage. The only way, it seems to me, that this makes any real sense is
that same-sex marriage would take away the priority of different-sex marriage
much as the discovery that the earth orbits the sun made the earth no better than
any other planetary body. While this disturbed contemporaries of Copernicus, it
does not disturb anyone today.
However, I suspect that when conservatives say that same-sex marriage
trivializes or demeans marriage,47 what they mean is that since they do not view
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same-sex marriage as marriage, if whatever goes on there is given the name
‘marriage,’ it weakens ‘real’ marriage by blurring the distinction between ‘real’
marriage and whatever it is that goes on among same-sex couples. But if we have a
Hegelian concept of spirit, and we see that its recognition of same-sex marriage
makes same-sex marriage real marriage, makes it ontologically real, then we see
that the reality of marriage has been extended, just as in a previous era it was
extended to mixed race couples and before that to couples from different religions.
This is hardly to erode marriage. It extends marriage, deepens it, and makes it more
universal. It gives us another example of the power of spirit to bind together what
had previously been found alien. This is a strengthening of spirit, not its erosion. As
we have seen earlier, anything short of the universal, anything that does not apply
equally to all, anything that denies a right to some, here the right to marry, will
sooner or later produce conflict and will sooner or later drive us to extend the law—
universalize it—to avoid the conflict. Spirit will be driven on toward the universal,
the rational, the right. Hegel’s theory of spirit and recognition philosophically
illuminates same-sex marriage better than any theory I know of.
A somewhat better argument by opponents is that approval of same-sex
marriage says to devout Christians, Jews, and Muslims that what their faiths teach is
false.48 This is true, but so did the discovery by Copernicus that the earth is not the
center of the cosmos, or by Darwin that humans are a product of evolution, tell these
faiths that some of their beliefs were false. Nevertheless, it is important to see here
that we do not have a case in which it is some alien entity (another church, a
political party, a government) that is condemning these faiths from outside or
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forcing them to change. Hegel shows us that it is spirit, their spirit as well as ours,
that produces change, and not as an alien force from outside, but from within us all.
At an early point in this process, it will appear to be an alien force, but sooner or
later we will see that it is our own spirit. That is certainly what has happened to us
with slavery. I suspect it is happening to us with same-sex marriage.
A similar objection by opponents is that the legalizing of same-sex marriage
implies approval of same-sex marriage, and they do not approve. Recognition,
however, needs to be distinguished from approval. Recognition makes the relation
objective and real. It says that the ex-slave is equal to anyone else. It says that a
marriage between people of different races or the same sex is as real as any other
marriage. It does not matter what I feel about ex-slaves, inter-racial marriage, or
same-sex marriage. What I feel is reduced to a subjective reaction irrelevant to the
objective reality. Recognition is ontologically much more important than approval,
though, of course, being around people who do not approve of your relationship can
be uncomfortable and cause you self-doubt. If we compare this to property, which is
made real by recognition from a proper authority, we see that your property really
is your property. It does not matter, for example, that I am a socialist and do not
approve of your ownership of this property. That may make you uncomfortable
when you are around me, perhaps even make you feel guilty, but it in no way
changes the fact that the property is your property—really your property. And so,
while approval would be nice, what proponents of same-sex marriage need is
recognition—the ontological reality of their marriage.
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Even if all objections to same-sex marriage could be answered, still opponents of
same-sex marriage are likely to say that marriage just is something between a man
and a woman and always has been throughout history. However, this is simply not
true. There are many places in the world today where one can marry a member of
one’s own sex. And of course in many societies and for a very long time, marriage
has been a relationship between a man and women, not just a woman. Moreover,
Eskridge, in an impressive book, has shown that same-sex unions have been legally
sanctioned at quite a few times and places in human history.49 The stage seems to
be set for spirit’s recognition of same-sex marriage. We will see if it occurs.
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